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Abstract 
This study empirically assesses the influence of globalization on the institutional root causes of 
gender equality as measured by the new OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI). We 
capture the multifaceted concept of globalization with the KOF index and its three sub-indices 
which measure the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization. Observing the 
progress of globalization for a sample of almost one hundred countries at ten year intervals 
starting in 1970, we find that economic and social globalization exerted a decidedly positive 
influence on the social institutions which underlie gender equality.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature dealing with the influence of globalization on economic wellbeing is well 
established and extensive. It encompasses studies on globalization-induced economic 
growth, on distributional effects across developed and developing countries, as well as 
studies on the within-country distribution across workers of different skill-levels and 
workers in different industries (e.g., Marjit et al. 2004). Research investigating the effects 
of globalization on gender equality is, in contrast, only about to emerge as an independent 
strand of the globalization literature. This neglect is surprising since the issue of gender 
equality has for a long time played an important role in the political discourse, especially 
among the discontents of globalization who, for example, claim that “women and other 
marginalized communities have suffered disproportionately from free trade agreements” 
and call on their followers to act using slogans such as “Women unite in the global fight!”
1  
  The political discourse on gender equality by nature heavily draws on some very 
specific aspects of the undisputed dark side of (international) labor markets such as forced 
labor, child labor, and the international trafficking of women.
2 Recent economic studies on 
the relationship between globalization and gender equality, in contrast, mainly focus on the 
gender wage gap and women’s employment opportunities. The seminal study by Boserup 
(1970) marks the beginning of this literature. From a naive theoretical viewpoint the 
relationship between deepening globalization and the gender wage gap in developing 
countries appears to be clear-cut. Since global competition restricts gender-based employer 
discrimination, the gender wage gap will become smaller (cf. Becker, 1957). The 
traditional Stolper-Samuelsson effect works in the same direction: developing countries 
have a comparative advantage in the production of goods which are intensive in low-skilled 
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   Women & the economy, UNPAC - UN Platform for Action Committee Manitoba: 
http://www.unpac.ca/economy/introglob.html. 
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 An economic analysis of the deprivation of sexually exploited trafficked women is to be found in Di Tommaso et al. 
(2009).   2
labor, implying that the female workers, who have, as a rule, a relatively poor education, 
stand to gain.  
  In a world characterized by heterogeneous labor, the coarseness of a comparative 
advantage argument based on a simple two factor Heckscher-Ohlin model is however not 
able to disentangle all redistribution effects that are triggered by global economic 
integration. The standard argument does, in particular, not consider that globalization gives 
rise to a transfer of technology to low-wage countries with the consequence that highly 
skilled workers (i.e. mainly men) in the low-wage countries will benefit from the 
technology transfer more than they lose via the increase in imports of sophisticated 
merchandise and services (Acemoglu, 1998). Empirical evidence supporting this effect has 
been documented, for example, by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) who analyze the impact of 
foreign direct investments on the skilled labor share of wages in Mexico over 1975-1988. 
Women, moreover, mainly work in the agricultural sector which in most developing 
countries does not play a major role in international trade; female agricultural labor thus 
hardly derives any profit from international trade. Some scholars, finally, even claim that in 
several developing countries gender inequalities in the labor market have been used as a 
strategic instrument to procuring advantages in international competition (cf., for example, 
Cagatay and Ertürk, 2004). These interpretations do however not match well with the 
literature that analyzes how multinational enterprises select countries to host their foreign 
direct investments. Here the evidence rather favors the view that potential host countries 
with a decent human rights record and small gender disparities have an advantage in 
attracting FDI (cf. Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Busse and Hefeker, 2007, Busse and 
Nunnenkamp, 2009).  
  The nexus between the gender wage gap and globalization is clearly a complex one with 
mutually contradictory channels of influence. The issue is furthermore exacerbated because 
empirical studies have to work with rather unreliable data on raw and residual gender wage   3
gaps. In many countries gender-specific wage data is simply not available, implying that 
cross-country studies stand on shaky grounds. The empirical literature is therefore far from 
being conclusive. A new promising approach has recently been introduced by Oostendorp 
(2009) who analyzes within-occupation wage gaps and finds that in richer countries the 
occupational gender wage gap varies negatively with increasing economic development, 
FDI penetration, and foreign trade, but finds little evidence for a reduction of the gap in 
poor countries. Women’s employment opportunities in these poor countries, on the other 
hand, appear to have improved in the course of globalization (cf. Ozler, 2000) and may 
even have shifted the household bargaining power in favor of women (cf. Aguayo-Tellez et 
al., 2010). 
  Because of the rather dire state of international wage data sets, many scholars have 
settled for a research strategy that focuses on other links between globalization and the 
status of women. Schultz (2007), for example, appraises the potential productivity of men 
and women (and thereby, in an indirect manner, the gender wage gap) by gender-specific 
human capital which, in turn, is determined by the schooling record and health status of 
men and women. These indicators are, of course, also proxies for general wellbeing. 
Analyzing a cross-section of 70 countries observed at five year intervals between 1960 and 
1980, Schultz finds that liberalization of trade is linked to greater accumulation of human 
capital and increased gender equality.
3 In a similar vein, Neumayer and de Soysa (2007) 
argue that the female employment share in the labor force and the gender wage gap are not 
ideal measures for gender-related aspects of employment since there are many other forms 
of discrimination. They employ instead measures of women’s labor rights (right to work, 
hiring and promotion practices, freedom of choice of profession, etc.) and forced labor and 
find in a global sample of countries and a sub-sample of developing countries that countries 
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 The causal relationship running from gender equality in education to economic growth is analyzed in Abu-Ghaida and 
Klasen (2004). These authors estimate that countries which do not meet the Millennium Summit by 2005 goals will 
suffer a 0.1-0.3 percentage point lower per capita growth rate.   4
which are more open to trade and enjoy a higher penetration by foreign direct investments 
have better labor rights for women and exhibit a lower incidence of forced labor. Richards 
and Gelleny (2007) investigate the influence of economic globalization on women’s status. 
Their dataset contains 130 countries over the 1982-2003 period. Women’s status is 
measured by five indicators: the Gender-related Devolopment Index (GDI), the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM), and the CIRI economic, political and social rights 
indicator (Cingranelli and Richards 2005). Economic globalization is measured by foreign 
direct investment, trade openness, portfolio investment and structural adjustment policy 
implementation (IMF and World Bank). The results show that especially trade openness 
had a positive influence on the status of women. The human rights data by Cingranelli and 
Richards have been used in other empirical studies: Neumayer and de Soysa (2011) show, 
for example, that trade and investment linkages influenced empowerment of women over 
the 1981-2007 period. Globalization is modeled by trade and FDI spatially weighted 
variables. Spill-over effects via trade links improved women’s economic and social rights 
in middle and high income countries, but not in low income countries. Spill-over effects via 
FDI links only improved economic rights in middle income countries. Cho (2011) shows 
that especially social aspects of globalization as measured by information flows, personal 
contact and cultural proximity positively influenced women’s rights over the 1981-2008 
period. Cultural proximity also mitigated son preference problems by women in developing 
countries and more personal contact decreased human trafficking. The results by Dreher et 
al (2011) show that especially social globalization as measured by the KOF index of social 
globalization increased empowerment rights over the 1981-2004 period. 
  Our study follows a similar strategy. We do not attempt to identify globalization induced 
effects on the gender wage gap directly but rather investigate how globalization impacts on 
women’s relative status as measured by a composite indicator capturing institutional 
arrangements that are liable to influences, among other things, the labor market prospects   5
of women. We thus do not use one or two specific aspects of relative welfare such as 
education or health, nor do we focus entirely on labor market rights; our indicator of gender 
equality is rather supposed to capture all aspects constituting the institutional environment 
that governs women’s choice options. For that purpose we use the new Social Institutions 
and Gender Index (SIGI) compiled by the OECD (cf. Branisa, Klasen and Ziegler, 2009a).
4  
In this respect our research strategy is closely related to some recent studies that used the 
SIGI as an explanatory variable to investigate the influence of gender inequality on socio-
economic outcomes. Branisa et al. (2009b) examine, for example, how institutions 
fostering gender equality (as measured by the SIGI) have influenced female secondary 
schooling, fertility rates, child mortality, and governance (rule of law, voice, and 
accountability). The results presented by Jüttig et al. (2010) show that these institutions 
have also influenced labor market outcomes in developing countries: women’s labor 
market participation, the quality of their jobs, and their working conditions vary positively 
with gender equality as measured by the SIGI. These results are of course vitally important 
for development economics because they show that gender equality in education, health, 
employment, et cetera – whether these aspects of gender equality are spurred by 
globalization or not – increase economic growth (e.g., Dollar and Gatti 1999, Klasen 2002, 
Knowles et al. 2002, Klasen and Lamanna 2009). 
  Figure 1 illustrates our contribution by summarizing the four strands of the empirical 
literature dealing with the globalization-growth nexus. The traditional macro view (arrow 
1) focuses on the overall gains from global economic integration (trade and factor market 
liberalization) but implicitly subsumes in the estimated growth effects the contribution that 
accrues from the globalization-induced increase in gender equality. The literature primarily 
concerned with the globalization-induced changes in the socio-economic status of women 
is represented by arrow 2 and the recent literature that relates gender equality outcomes 
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 For a critique of the well known UNDP gender-related indices see Bardhan and Klasen, (1999).   6
with economic performance by arrow 3. Our research focuses on how globalization impacts 
on the design of institutions that influence in turn gender equality outcomes in the long run 
(arrow 4), the idea being that it is the institutional setup that gives rise to sustainable 
progress in actually observed gender equality and thereby to economic development. The 
advantage of our research strategy as compared to the more traditional approach that 
directly relates globalization to gender equality outcomes is that the investigated channels 
of influence are less likely to be obfuscated by problems of reverse causality. Since 
institutional change is subject to a great deal of inertia, a strong cross-country relationship 
between institutional design and the rather volatile indicators of global integration lends 
credibility to the interpretation that it is indeed the institutions that (slowly) adjust to the 
ever-changing socio-economic environment and not vice versa.  We do, of course, back up 
our conclusions with respect to causality by exploiting the time-series dimension which is 
however only available for our explaining variables. Up to now the SIGI is, unfortunately, 
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Figure 1: The nexus between globalization, gender equality, and growth 
 
    
  A second distinguishing feature of our study is that we do not use any of the traditional 
measures of globalization such as trade policy restrictions, exposure to international trade, 
FDI penetration, etc.
5 We rather acknowledge that globalization is a multi-faceted concept 
that cannot be captured by one or two economic indicators and therefore use the KOF index 
of globalization which is an all-embracing indicator that captures the three main 
dimensions of globalization, i.e. economic, political, and social globalization (cf. Dreher, 
2006, and Dreher et al., 2008). 
  The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the Social Institutions 
and Gender Index (SIGI) and the KOF index of globalization. Section 3 sets up the 
empirical model and describes the empirical strategy of identifying globalization-induced 
effects on gender equality. Section 4 presents the regression results and section 5 
concludes. 
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Economic growth   8
2. Data: Gender equality and globalization 
2.1 The Social Institutions and Gender Index  
To measure gender equality we use the recently published Social Institutions and Gender 
Index (SIGI) that provides data for about 120 developing countries. The focus of this index 
is on social institutions related to gender equality. It is therefore ideally suited for our 
strategy of identifying the influence of globalization on the formal and informal norms of 
behavior which shape gender roles and women’s opportunities in social life.  
    The SIGI is based on twelve institutional variables compiled in the OECD 
Gender, Institutions and Development database (cf. Branisa et al., 2009a) and roughly 
refers to the year 2000. With the help of these twelve variables, five sub-indices are 
constructed: family code, civil liberties, physical integrity, son preference, and ownership 
rights. The family code sub-index measures women’s decision-making power at home and 
encompasses the variables parental authority, inheritance, early marriage, and polygamy. 
The civil liberties sub-index measures the women’s opportunity to engage in social 
participation and is based on the two variables freedom of movement and freedom of dress. 
Physical integrity is associated with the variables violence against women, female genital 
mutilation, and missing women. Son preference is portrayed by a single variable and 
ownership rights are measured by access to land, access to other property, and access to 
bank loans. These five dimensions of social institutions are then aggregated by computing 
the average of the squares of the sub-indices which range from 0 (no inequality) to 1 
(complete inequality). Taking the squares of the sub-indices takes into account, first, that 
the denial of opportunities is associated with increasing marginal deprivation and, second, 
that high inequality in one dimension is not compensated by high equality in another 
dimension. We employ in our econometric model the reverse of the SIGI (i.e. 1 – SIGI) 
which ranges from 0 (complete inequality) to 1 (equality) simply in order to associate 
positive coefficients with a positive influence of globalization on gender equality.   9
 The  composite  Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) thus represents a broad 
measure of how severely women are institutionally constrained in their social lives. In 
other words, the SIGI is a measure of deprivation that captures one of the primary causes of 
gender inequality; it is not a measure of gender inequality in outcomes. This is why this 
index lends itself to be used in a study that attempts to uncover the long-run impact of 
globalization on gender equality. To be sure, the institutional foundations that constrain 
social behavior may not be directly linked to international economic integration. But then 
globalization is not merely an economic phenomenon. International integration also has 
very conspicuous political and social dimensions, and it is quite evident that these 
dimensions - which may well be connected to the economic dimension in intricate ways - 
are directly linked to changes in formal and informal norms of social behavior. It is one of 
the objectives of this study to disentangle the channels of influence that connect 
progressing globalization with the evolution of gender equality. 
 
2.2 The KOF index of globalization 
We measure globalization with the help of the KOF index since this index explicitly 
acknowledges that globalization is a multi-faceted concept that cannot be entirely captured 
by a single “representative” economic indicator such as international trade as a share of 
GDP, the volume or stock of received foreign direct investments per capita, or the severity 
of capital account restrictions. The KOF index (cf. Dreher, 2006, and Dreher et al., 2008) 
represents an attempt to measure globalization in the broad sense that has been accepted in 
the recent empirical literature. It now covers 208 countries, includes 24 variables, and 
portrays the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization. Each of these three 
dimensions is composed of further sub-dimensions. For example, economic globalization is 
measured by actual flows and stocks (trade, foreign direct investments, portfolio 
investments, and income payments to foreign nationals, each measured as a percentage of   10
GDP) and restrictions (mean tariff rates, hidden import barriers, taxes on international 
trade, and capital account restrictions). Social globalization covers, among others, items 
such as international tourism, the number of internet hosts and users, as well as the number 
of McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA shops (per capita). Political globalization is measured 
by the number of foreign embassies, membership in international organizations, and the 
participation in U.N. Security Council missions (see Dreher et al., 2008, 43-44, for further 
details). In this study, we use the updated 2010 KOF index of globalization which measures 




2.3 Correlation between the reversed SIGI and the KOF indices of globalization 
To illustrate the association between globalization and gender equality, we present 
correlations between gender equality as measured by the reversed SIGI (overall) and the 
KOF globalization indices. Figure 3 suggests that overall globalization is positively 
associated with gender equality. The correlation coefficient between the overall KOF index 
of globalization and the reversed SIGI is 0.58. In a similar vein, the correlation between the 
KOF index of economic globalization and reversed SIGI is 0.42 (Figure 3) and 0.45 
between the KOF index of social globalization reversed SIGI (Figure 4). By contrast, 
political globalization is hardly associated with gender equality: the correlation coefficient 
between the KOF index of political globalization and reversed SIGI is 0.05. Gender 
equality and globalization are high in countries such as Singapore, Chile and Argentina and 
low in countries such as Sudan, Yemen and Sierra Leone. Table A1 lists all countries 
included and the individual values of the reversed SIGI and the overall KOF index. 
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 The KOF index has frequently been used to measure globalization in recent empirical research on the influence of 
globalization on human development and economic policy-making (see, for example, Bergh and Nilsson 2010a, 2010b, 
Bjørnskov 2010). 
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3. The empirical model 
The basic econometric model has the following form: 
 
Gender Equalityi = αj Globalizationij + Σk ζk xik +Σl δl Regionil +Σm γm Legal Originim + ui                     
 
with i = 1,...,99; j=1,..,4; k=1,...,3; l=1,...,4;m=1,...,3.           (1) 
The dependent variable Gender Equalityi associates gender equality in country i with the 
value  [ ] 10 , 1 i SIGI −∈ ; values of this reversed SIGI index close to unity thus indicate high 
gender equality. Globalizationij denotes the j
th dimension of the KOF globalization index 
(overall, economic, social, and political dimension). In our base-line specification, we use 
the KOF globalization indices for the year 2000 and expect a positive influence of the four 
dimensions of globalization on gender equality. The vector xi contains our political-
economic control variables. We include the logarithm of real GDP per capita and the 
logarithm of total population – both for the year 2000. We also include the Democracy-
Dictatorship dummy variable by Cheibub et al. (2010) for the year 2000. The Democracy-
Dictatorship variable distinguishes between regimes in which executive and legislative 
offices are allocated in contested elections and those regimes in which this is not the case. 
The variable assumes the value one for democracies and zero otherwise.
7  Regionil  are 
regional dummy variables assuming the value one if country i belongs to region l and zero 
otherwise. We distinguish between four different regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and 
South America. To avoid perfect collinearity between the region dummies, one of the 
region dummies serves as the reference category (here Africa). The estimated effects of the 
other region dummies can then be interpreted as deviations from the reference category. 
Legal Originim are legal origin dummy variables (La Porta et al. 1999). We distinguish 
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 See Cheibub et al. (2010) for a more encompassing discussion on classifying democracies and dictatorships. The more 
traditional measures of democracy are the POLITY IV and the Freedom House indices. These indices have, however, 
been criticized on several grounds (Munk and Verkuilen 2002, Vreeland 2008, Cheibub et al. 2010).   12
between three different legal origins: British, French and Socialist.
8 Our reference category 
is British legal origin. Table A2 shows descriptive statistics of all variables. 
  We estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors. 
  
4. Results 
4.1 Basic results 
Table 1 shows our base-line regression results. The control variables display the expected 
signs and are statistically significant in several cases. Per capita income is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in columns (3) and (5) and has in these estimates a positive sign. 
The numerical meaning of the estimated coefficients is that when GDP per capita increases 
by 1%, the reversed SIGI increases by about 0.03 points. Higher income is thus associated 
with more subsequent gender equality. Population size is statistically significant at the 5% 
level in column (1) and has a negative sign. This estimate indicates that gender equality as 
measured by the reversed SIGI is in a given country by 0.1 points higher than in an 
otherwise similar country if it has a 10% smaller population.
9 The democracy variable has 
the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (4) and 
(5) and indicates that the reversed SIGI is about 0.05 points higher in democracies than in 
dictatorships. The estimates of the regional dummy variables for Asia and Eastern Europe 
do not turn out to be statistically significant, while South American countries have a higher 
level of gender equality than Africa; this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level (at 
the 5% level in column 5). The coefficients of the socialist legal origin variable are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and indicate that gender equality is higher in 
countries with a socialist legacy as compared to countries with a British legal origin. The 
French legal origin variable does not turn out to be statistically significant. 
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 We have no countries with Scandinavian and German legal origin in our sample. 
9
 This effect is numerically quite big and entirely driven by China and India which have extremely high populations and 
rather little gender equality. When excluding China and India the coefficient of the logarithm of total population does 
not turn out to be significantly different from zero.   13
  Most importantly, the results reported in Table 1 show that globalization has had a 
positive influence on gender equality. The coefficients of the overall KOF index of 
globalization (for the year 2000) are statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1) 
and at the 5% level in column (2) and indicate that gender equality as measured by the 
reversed SIGI increases by about 0.0035 points if the overall KOF index of globalization 
increases by one point. Against the background of the standard deviation of 12.83 of the 
overall KOF index this is a numerically substantial effect: when the overall KOF index 
increases by one standard deviation, the reversed SIGI increases by about 0.045 points. The 
KOF indices of economic and social globalization (columns 3 and 4) are statistically 
significant at the 5% level and indicate that gender inequality as measured by the reversed 
SIGI increases by about 0.0015 points if the KOF index of economic globalization 
increases by one point and by about 0.0029 points if the KOF index of social globalization 
increases by one point. That is, when the KOF index of economic globalization increases 
by one standard deviation (14.49 points), the reversed SIGI increases by about 0.022 points 
and when the KOF index of social globalization increases by one standard deviation (16.69 
points), the reversed SIGI increases by about 0.048 points. The KOF index of political 
globalization (column 5) does not turn out to be statistically significant. The results thus 
lend credibility to our hypothesis that social globalization is an important driving force of 
gender equality. 
  Following up this conjecture, we use the fact the influence of globalization on gender 
equality is likely to take time. We therefore replaced the four KOF indices of globalization 
referring to the year 2000 by the three KOF indices of globalization for the years 1990, 
1980 and 1970. Table 2 shows the results (we do not report the results of the control 
variables)
10. The influence of the overall KOF index of globalization on gender equality 
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 We have used the logarithm of real GDP per capita and population for the years 1990, 1980 and 1970 as control 
variables. The democracy variable is not available for a battery of developing countries before 1991 and we have   14
(column 1) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the years 1970 and 
1980) but is not statistically significant for the year 1990. The KOF index of economic 
globalization does not turn out to be statistically significant. The KOF index of social 
globalization is statistically significant at the 10% level for the years 1990 and 1970 and at 
the 5% level for the year 1980. The KOF index of political globalization, finally, is 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the year 1980 but does not turn out to be 
statistically significant for the years 1990 and 1970. These results again indicate that social 
globalization has been the driving force of gender equality. Moreover, it transpires that the 
whole build-up of economic and social global integration over the last forty years has had a 
positive influence on the contemporary relative status of women. 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
We have checked the robustness of our results in several ways. Gender equality has been 
very pronounced in the socialist countries. We therefore excluded all Eastern European 
countries because their socialist past might bias our estimates. The results reported in Table 
3 suggest however that excluding the Eastern European countries does not change our base-
line estimates at all. We have also re-estimated the regressions that use the globalization 
indicators for the years 1990, 1980 and 1970 without the Eastern European countries. The 
results are almost identical to the ones reported in Table 2. 
  Cultural traits are often believed to exert a strong influence on gender equality. 
Protestantism, for example, had a decidedly positive influence on gender equality in 
education (Becker and Woessmann 2009, 2010, Norton and Tomal 2009, Cooray and 
Potrafke 2011). Islam, on the other hand, has been shown to have a negative influence on 
gender equality (cf. Baliamoune-Lutz, 2006, and Neumayer and de Soysa, 2007). To 
control for these cultural traits we employ the data on religious fractionalization by Alesina 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
therefore excluded the democracy variable in these regressions. Inferences regarding the globalization variables do not 
change however when we include the democracy variable for the year 2000.   15
et al. (2003). This database reports for each country in the year 1980 the percentage of the 
population belonging to the three most widespread religions in the world. The database 
contains however many missing observations. The most complete data is available for 
Islam. We therefore focus on the share of a country’s Muslim population. In Alesina’s data 
base the category “Muslim” is for some countries subdivided in “Shia Muslim” and “Sunni 
Muslim”, for other countries this sub-division is not recorded. We therefore combine the 
available data to obtain a single variable that describes the share of Muslims in the total 
population of each country. The results reported in Table 4 show that the coefficient of this 
Muslim variable is statistically significant at the 1% level (at the 5% level in column 2) and 
has a negative sign. The numerical meaning is that gender equality decreases by about 
0.001 points if the share of Muslims increases by one percentage point, implying that 
gender equality in a country with no Muslims is by 0.1 points higher than in an otherwise 
identical but purely Muslim country. Notice, that including the Muslim variable does not 
change the inferences with respect to the globalization variables. In fact, including the 
Muslim variable rather intensifies the influence of globalization, i.e. excluding the Muslim 
variable appears to induce some omitted variable bias. 
  We have also included average years of total schooling by Barro and Lee (2010) in 
order to capture a second dimension of culture (not reported here). Average years of total 
schooling in the population aged 15 (25) and over are statistically significant at the 1% 
level and have the expected positive signs. The effects indicate that one additional year of 
total schooling increases the inversed SIGI by about 0.01 to 0.02 points. Including the 
average years of total schooling does not change the inference that globalization had a 
positive influence on the inversed SIGI: the globalization variables remain statistically 
significant at the 5% or 10% level. The average years of total schooling collected by Barro 
and Lee (2010) are however not available for the entire sample of 96 countries in the year 
2000, but only for 83 countries. In particular, countries with low gender equality such as   16
Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea and Nigeria are excluded. This explains the somewhat 
weaker globalization-induced effects when including the average years of total schooling. 
  The reported effects could also be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in 
individual countries. For this reason, we checked whether the results are sensitive to the 
inclusion/exclusion of particular countries. Our results (not reported here) indicate that this 
is not the case. 
  The upper limit of the SIGI is censored to one, the lower limit to zero. For this reason 
one may well want to estimate a censored regression model (e.g., Tobit) because the 
standard assumptions of OLS are, strictly speaking, not satisfied. It is important to note, 
however, that in the entire sample the dependent variable in no case assumes the value zero 
or one. While the reversed SIGI is never close to zero, it is in several cases close to one. 
We have therefore estimated a Tobit model. Again, the results are very similar to the OLS 
base-line results. 
    
5. Conclusion 
Heartrending anecdotal evidence promulgated by NGOs, the media, and the political 
discourse is supposed to prove that globalization is hurting the poorest of the poor, i.e. the 
downtrodden in the developing countries: indentured laborers, the sick, women, and 
children. The intended political consequence of this kind of publicity is of course to 
accommodate to the discontents of global economic integration and to reestablish barriers 
to the international trade, investment, and migration.  
  Since rational policy-making cannot be based on selective evidence that is, moreover, 
often gathered from obscure and dubious sources, many scholars have begun to study 
globalization-induced effects on the well-being of the most depraved. The results of these 
scholarly studies do not support the generally held belief that globalization is good for the 
rich and bad for the poor. Many of these empirical investigations that are based on large   17
representative samples arrive at conclusions that are compatible with the overall evaluation 
that a policy of openness is actually one of the most promising strategies to alleviate 
poverty. This result is moreover perfectly in line with the fundamental economic notion 
that the ubiquitous factor will gain from market integration – and this is in the developing 
countries unskilled labor. One is therefore left to speculate about the motives of the 
promoters of the anti-globalization movement in the developed countries who – when one 
adopts a clinical economic view – do not appear to defend the needy in the South but rather 
the low-skilled in the North.  
  Our study contributes to this growing economic literature by empirically investigating 
the influence of globalization on one of the target groups of international commiseration: 
the women in the developing countries. In contrast to related studies we do not consider 
outcome-related aspects of the well-being of women such as the gender wage gap, female 
employment shares, education and health status of women, etc. We rather focus on the 
basic institutional parameters which guide the women’s daily routine in the developing 
countries. To measure the prevailing institutions’ gender blindness, we employ the new 
OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI). The idea of this strategy is of course to 
identify the long-run consequences of deepening globalization. A second distinguishing 
feature of our approach is that we use the multi-faceted KOF indicator of globalization in 
order to disentangle the impacts of the three major dimensions of globalization.  
  The results of our study are well in line with the gist of the evidence that emerges from 
the related literature: deepening globalization is, in general, good for the women living in 
developing countries. In our case we conclude that deepening globalization gives rise to 
more gender equality which we interpret to imply that international integration will, in the 
long run, improve the well-being of women. Moreover we find that it is mainly the social 
aspect of globalization that drives gender equality. In the light of the political landscape of 
developing countries, we believe this result to be quite plausible. Economic integration is   18
not a contested issue in these countries, social integration is however extraordinarily 
controversial since it is strongly related to “americanization” (cf. Friedman 1999) or, as 
Dreher and Gaston (2007: 166) succinctly put it, “globalization implies institutional 
convergence to some common (U.S.) benchmark.” In other words, global economic 
integration is, overall, beneficial for the developing countries, and it is also beneficial for 
the ruling elites as long as the elite is in a position to appropriate a substantial part of these 
gains from trade. Social globalization, on the other hand, is, as we argue, tantamount to 
empowering the oppressed and therefore represents an issue that potentially undermines the 
traditional political-economic order. It is therefore not surprising that in developing 
countries with strong ruling elites or male dominated cultures, social globalization is 
virtually demonized by the established ruling class. Our finding that it is especially hard to 
advocate the adoption of gender equality in countries with large Muslim populations is a 
case in point. 
  Our results admit a decidedly optimistic view of the globalization process with respect 
to the status of women in the developing countries. Even if it were true that some outcome 
related measures indicated that incipient globalization has had a negative effect on gender 
equality, these findings are likely to represent mere teething troubles. These problems, 
irritating as they may be, should not be overvalued because globalization, especially social 
globalization, clearly invigorates the fundamental driving forces of gender equality. 
Globalization will, therefore, eventually give rise to more gender equality. 
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Correlation coefficient: 0.42. Source: Branisa et al. (2009) and Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). 
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Correlation coefficient: 0.58.  Source: Branisa et al. (2009) and Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). 
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Correlation coefficient: 0.45. Source: Branisa et al. (2009) and Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). 
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Correlation coefficient: 0.05.  Source: Branisa et al. (2009) and Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). 
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Table 1: Regression Results. 
Dependent variable: Gender Equality = reversed SIGI (overall) 
OLS with robust standard errors. 
KOF Index 2000. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
KOF index of globalization (overall)  0.0038***  0.0032**       
 [3.95]  [2.62]       
KOF index of globalization (economic)     0.0015**    
     [2.12]    
KOF index of globalization (social)     0.0029**  
     [2.53]  
KOF index of globalization (political)         0.001 
       [1.11] 
log GDP per capita    -0.0037 0.0270** -0.0100 0.0337** 
    [0.26] [2.21] [0.66] [2.20] 
log Population    -0.0140*  -0.0021  -0.007  -0.0164 
    [1.96] [0.32] [1.01] [1.43] 
Democracy   0.0341  0.0238  0.0451**  0.0473** 
    [1.57] [1.29] [2.00] [2.12] 
Asia   -0.005  -0.0417  -0.0186  -0.0332 
    [0.16] [1.36] [0.64] [0.80] 
Eastern  Europe    -0.0312 -0.0377 -0.0696 -0.0614 
    [0.72] [0.84] [1.45] [1.11] 
South  America    0.0836*** 0.0737*** 0.0794***  0.0824** 
    [2.89] [2.67] [2.68] [2.62] 
Legal Origin (french)    0.0277  0.0065  0.0287  0.0097 
    [0.92] [0.29] [0.95] [0.35] 
Legal Origin (socialist)    0.1524***  0.1269***  0.1580***  0.1770*** 
    [4.46] [3.49] [4.33] [4.54] 
Constant  0.7055*** 0.8178*** 0.5758*** 0.8436*** 0.6384*** 
  [14.45]  [7.03] [4.44] [7.71] [4.49] 
Observations  98 96 86 96 99 
R-squared  0.18 0.51 0.59 0.51 0.51 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
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Table 2:  Regression Results. 
Dependent variable: Gender Equality = reversed SIGI (overall) 
OLS with robust standard errors. 
Lagged KOF Indices. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
KOF index of globalization 1990 (overall)  0.0017       
 [1.11]       
KOF index of globalization 1990 (economic)    0.0007     
   [0.84]     
KOF index of globalization 1990 (social)      0.0023*   
     [1.79]   
KOF index of globalization 1990 (political)      -0.0005 
       [0.53] 
KOF index of globalization 1980 (overall)  0.0042***       
 [3.70]       
KOF index of globalization 1980 (economic)    0.0012     
   [1.38]     
KOF index of globalization 1980 (social)      0.0025**   
     [2.16]   
KOF index of globalization 1980 (political)      0.0014* 
       [1.86] 
KOF index of globalization 1970 (overall)  0.0038***       
 [2.84]       
KOF index of globalization 1970 (economic)    0.0009     
   [1.09]     
KOF index of globalization 1970 (social)      0.0029*   
     [1.93]   
KOF index of globalization 1970 (political)      0.0001 
       [0.07] 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
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Table 3:  Regression Results. 
Dependent variable: Gender Equality = reversed SIGI (overall) 
OLS with robust standard errors. 
KOF Index 2000. Eastern European countries excluded. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
KOF index of globalization (overall)  0.0035***  0.0033**       
 [3.61]  [2.58]       
KOF index of globalization (economic)     0.0015*    
     [1.82]    
KOF index of globalization (social)     0.0029**  
     [2.36]  
KOF index of globalization (political)         0.0013 
       [1.34] 
log GDP per capita    -0.0071 0.0257* -0.0112 0.0300* 
    [0.46] [1.95] [0.71] [1.93] 
log Population    -0.0162**  -0.0039  -0.0088  -0.0212* 
    [2.12] [0.53] [1.17] [1.70] 
Democracy   0.0407*  0.0272  0.0512**  0.0518** 
    [1.72] [1.37] [2.08] [2.16] 
Asia    -0.0022 -0.0386 -0.0166 -0.0265 
    [0.07] [1.25] [0.57] [0.63] 
South America    0.0817***  0.0744**  0.0779**  0.0821** 
    [2.74] [2.61] [2.54] [2.56] 
Legal Origin (french)    0.0294  0.0069  0.0299  0.0106 
    [0.96] [0.30] [0.98] [0.38] 
Legal Origin (socialist)    0.1537***  0.1267***  0.1590***  0.1807*** 
    [4.52] [3.50] [4.38] [4.61] 
Constant  0.7105*** 0.8541*** 0.6019*** 0.8667*** 0.6872*** 
  [14.31]  [7.02] [4.39] [7.60] [4.71] 
Observations  91 89 79 89 92 
R-squared  0.16 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.49 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
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Table 4:  Regression Results. 
Dependent variable: Gender Equality = reversed SIGI (overall) 
OLS with robust standard errors. 
KOF Index 2000. Muslim variable included. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
KOF index of globalization (overall)  0.0033***       
 [2.96]       
KOF index of globalization (economic)    0.0014**    
    [2.08]    
KOF index of globalization (social)     0.0027**  
     [2.47]  
KOF index of globalization (political)       0.0016* 
       [1.74] 
log GDP per capita  0.0003 0.0332*** -0.0017 0.0329** 
  [0.02] [2.66] [0.12] [2.42] 
log Population  -0.0145**  -0.0033  -0.0076  -0.0222* 
  [2.02] [0.49] [1.03] [1.87] 
Democracy 0.0309  0.0271*  0.0418**  0.0379** 
  [1.63] [1.69] [2.13] [2.04] 
Asia 0.014  -0.0232  -0.0001  0.0033 
  [0.49] [0.76] [0.00] [0.08] 
Eastern  Europe  -0.0293 -0.0318 -0.0631 -0.0441 
  [0.72] [0.72] [1.33] [0.88] 
South  America  0.0394 0.0398 0.0397 0.0375 
  [1.21] [1.54] [1.19] [1.09] 
Legal Origin (french)  0.0591*  0.0353*  0.0572*  0.0459 
  [1.85] [1.69] [1.77] [1.53] 
Legal Origin (socialist)  0.1475***  0.1233***  0.1517***  0.1705*** 
  [4.54] [3.46] [4.32] [4.78] 
Muslim -0.0009***  -0.0007**  -0.0009***  -0.0011*** 
  [2.93] [2.24] [2.79] [3.04] 
Constant  0.8011*** 0.5472*** 0.8083*** 0.6788*** 
  [6.92] [4.49] [7.52] [5.11] 
Observations  95 85 95 98 
R-squared 0.6  0.65  0.59  0.6 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
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Table A1. List of countries included. 
Country  SIGI_INV KOF_ov_2000 Country  SIGI_INV KOF_ov_2000
Afghanistan 0.42    Kuwait  0.81  65.78
Albania  0.89 43.09 Kyrgyzstan  0.97 53.59
Algeria  0.81  46.51 Lao People's Democratic Republic  0.96  24.16
Argentina 1.00  64.88 Liberia  0.77   
Armenia  0.97  50.50 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.74  53.65
Azerbaijan  0.97 48.31 Macedonia  0.98 46.25
Bahrain  0.80 67.56 Madagascar  0.93 32.35
Bangladesh  0.76 33.02 Malawi  0.86 38.70
Belarus  0.99 47.01 Mali  0.66 38.22
Benin  0.81 37.93 Mauritania  0.85 37.60
Bhutan 0.84  26.72 Mauritius 0.99  50.09
Bolivia  0.99 57.02 Moldova  0.99 54.75
Botswana  0.92 49.58 Mongolia  0.96 41.41
Brazil  0.98 58.11 Morocco  0.95 51.65
Burkina  Faso  0.84 38.59 Mozambique  0.80 44.16
Burundi  0.89 25.62 Myanmar  0.95 14.16
Cambodia  0.98 39.59 Namibia  0.92 53.23
Cameroon  0.78 39.37 Nepal  0.83 35.24
Central African Republic  0.82  27.65 Nicaragua  0.98  54.58
Chad  0.68 27.32 Niger  0.82 31.53
Chile  0.98 69.18 Nigeria  0.78 49.34
China  0.78 54.21 Pakistan  0.72 46.38
Colombia  0.99 53.64 Papua  New  Guinea  0.79 39.95
Congo, Democratic Republic  0.80 23.04 Paraguay  1.00 48.33
Costa  Rica  0.99 62.60 Peru  0.99 57.06
Croatia  1.00 65.10 Philippines  0.99 56.54
Cuba  0.98 47.52 Russian  Federation  0.99 62.98
Côte  d''Ivoire  0.86 46.88 Rwanda  0.83 26.91
Dominican  Republic  0.96 54.60 Senegal  0.89 47.10
Ecuador  0.99 54.57 Sierra  Leone  0.66 31.32
Egypt  0.78 54.42 Singapore  0.98 86.77
El Salvador  0.99  57.78 South Africa  0.91  61.38
Equatorial Guinea  0.82  22.94 Sri Lanka  0.94  48.65
Eritrea  0.86 24.40 Sudan  0.32 31.11
Ethiopia  0.77 32.39 Swaziland  0.84 49.15
Fiji 0.95  50.76 Syrian  Arab Republic  0.86  40.42
Gabon  0.78 46.92 Tajikistan  0.97 27.06
Gambia  0.82 47.40 Tanzania  0.89 32.49
Georgia  0.97 46.49 Thailand  0.99 58.72
Ghana  0.89 48.41 Togo  0.80 44.15
Guatemala  0.97  48.73 Trinidad and Tobago  0.98  60.86
Guinea  0.77 36.01 Tunisia  0.98 57.26
Honduras  0.97 55.51 Uganda  0.81 36.01
Hong Kong Special Administrative  0.99    Ukraine  0.99  59.91
India  0.68 44.23 United  Arab  Emirates  0.73 69.50
Indonesia  0.87 53.74 Uruguay  0.99 62.90
Iran  0.70 34.72 Venezuela  0.99 61.62
Iraq 0.72    Viet  Nam  0.97  37.98
Jamaica  0.95 61.24 Yemen  0.67 34.93
Kazakhstan  1.00 52.41 Zambia  0.78 50.65
Kenya  0.86 42.54 Zimbabwe  0.81 44.68
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Table A2. Data description and sources. 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Source 
SIGI  102  0.13  0.12  0.00  0.68  Branisa et al. (2009) 
KOF index of globalization 
(overall) 2000  98  46.57 12.83  14.16 86.77 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(economic) 2000  86  49.64 14.49  23.11 93.97 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(social) 2000  98 37.62  16.69  4.65  93.04 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(political) 2000  101  58.60 18.20  19.64 92.19 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(overall) 1990  96 34.21  10.96  9.66  81.43 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(economic)  1990  84  39.11 15.00  11.62 94.77 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(social) 1990  96  26.22  13.48  3.45  84.00 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(political) 1990  99  42.09  18.50  6.30  78.30 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(overall)  1980  95  33.43 10.23  11.55 76.16 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(economic)  1980  83  36.69 15.46  11.37 92.03 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(social) 1980  95  25.34  12.82  3.47  81.12 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(politcial) 1980  98  43.41  18.35  6.30  83.75 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(overall) 1970  94  29.37  8.91  11.08  60.38 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(economic)  1970  82  34.43 14.15  12.14 85.55 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(social) 1970  94  24.56  11.39  4.17  56.32 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
KOF index of globalization 
(politcial) 1970  97  31.65  14.97  6.30  79.98 
Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. 
(2008) 
GDP per capita (real) 2000  101  4932.50  5984.63  292.76  32246.91 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
Population  (total) 2000  102  46225.67  160743.00 491.48  1268853.00 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
GDP per capita (real) 1990  91  3710.08  4542.69  358.26  31180.96 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
Population  (total) 1990  102  39486.64  141206.20 371.10  1148365.00 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
GDP per capita (real) 1980  87  2872.94  5188.91  324.83  40009.61 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
Population  (total) 1980  101  32419.79  119740.30 256.01  984736.40 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
GDP per capita (real) 1970  87  920.69  1045.47  136.27  6346.48 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
Population  (total) 1970  101  26354.24  98883.35  219.54  820403.30 
Penn World Tables 6.3 
Summers and Heston (1991) 
Democracy 2000  100  0.42  0.50  0  1  Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Africa 102  0.42  0.50  0  1  own  calculation 
Asia 102  0.30  0.46  0  1  own  calculation 
Eastern Europe  102  0.07  0.25  0  1  own calculation 
South America  102  0.19  0.39  0  1  own calculation 
Legal Origin (UK)  102  0.31  0.47  0  1  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Legal Origin (french)  102  0.49  0.50  0  1  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Legal Origin (socialist)  102  0.20  0.40  0  1  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Muslim 101  30.67  38.72  0  99.89  Alesina et al. (2003) 
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Table A2. Data description and sources (continued). 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 15 and over 
2000  89  6.10  2.42  1.05  10.68  Barro and Lee (2010) 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 15 and over 
1990  89  5.20  2.36  0.90  10.39  Barro and Lee (2010) 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 15 and over 
1980  89  4.16  2.23  0.22  9.43  Barro and Lee (2010) 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 15 and over 
1970  89  3.10  1.98  0.05  8.41  Barro and Lee (2010) 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 25 and over 
2000  89  5.63  2.55  0.89  10.80  Barro and Lee (2010) 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 25 and over 
1990  89  4.59  2.40  0.28  10.07  Barro and Lee (2010) 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 25 and over 
1980  89  3.46  2.16  0.03  9.15  Barro and Lee (2010) 
Avg. years of total schooling in 
the population aged 25 and over 
1970  89  2.57  1.89  0  8.24  Barro and Lee (2010) 
 